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Although corporate risk-taking is economically necessary and even desirable, it can also be
harmful. There is widespread agreement that excessive corporate risk-taking was one of the
primary causes of the systemic collapse that caused the 2008-09 financial crisis. To avoid
another devastating collapse, most financial regulation since the crisis is directed at reducing
excessive corporate risk-taking by systemically important firms. Often that regulation focuses on
aligning managerial and investor interests, on the assumption that investors generally would
oppose excessively risky business ventures.
My article, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, argues that assumption is
flawed. What constitutes “excessive” risk-taking depends on the observer; risk-taking is
excessive from a given observer’s standpoint if, on balance, it is expected to harm that
observer. As a result, the law inadvertently allows systemically important firms to engage in
risk-taking ventures that are expected to benefit the firm and its investors but, because much of
the systemic harm from the firm’s failure would be externalized onto other market participants as
well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse, harm the public.
Pragmatically, regulators cannot control the myriad harmful externalities that result from
corporate risk-taking. But excessive risk-taking that causes the failure of a systemically
important firm can trigger a domino-like systemic collapse of other firms or markets, leading to
widespread unemployment and poverty. Regulation should try to control that risk-taking. Postfinancial-crisis regulation attempts to control that risk-taking without interfering with corporate
governance because financial regulation of corporate governance is thought to weaken the
wealth-producing capacities of the firm. Non-governance financial regulation is certainly
important. The article shows, however, that it is, and inevitably will be, insufficient to control the
excessive corporate risk-taking that causes systemic externalities.
The article then examines whether regulating corporate governance could help to control that
risk-taking, without weakening corporate wealth-producing capacity. It concludes that managers
of systemically important firms should not only have their traditional corporate governance duty
to investors but also a duty—which the article calls a “public governance duty”—not to engage
in excessive risk-taking that could systemically harm the public. Such a duty would help to align
private and public interests. It also would help to correct another critical regulatory failure—that
non-governance financial regulation usually lags financial innovation. That regulatory lag occurs
because non-governance financial regulation often depends on regulators precisely
understanding the particular design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related
institutions at the time the regulation is promulgated. The problem, though, is that the design
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and structure are constantly changing. The public governance duty, in contrast, would overcome
that time lag. If the firm is proposing to engage in a risky project that represents financial
innovation, its managers either have or, to fulfill their governance duties, should try to obtain the
most current information about the innovation and its consequences.
The proposed public governance duty is designed to avoid weakening corporate wealthproducing capacity. The duty merely requires managers to price in potential systemic costs
when deciding on a given risk-taking project. This recognizes that a firm’s wealth production to
society should be assessed net of systemic public harm. The article’s analysis of the public
governance duty also informs the larger debate over corporate governance models. The analysis
shows that such a duty should not be inconsistent with corporate governance law and theory. It
also explains why systemic externalities should count in limiting corporate governance autonomy
(and freedom of contract).
The public governance duty is designed to be practical, to minimize its impact on existing
corporate governance. For example, managers can perform the duty using information they
already know, with one exception: the systemic costs if the firm fails. Because government
financial regulators are likely to know much more about those costs than the firm’s managers,
the article proposes that regulators estimate and periodically update those costs as part of the
(existing) process of designating a firm as systemically important. The article also examines
other practical concerns, including how its public governance duty should be legally imposed,
how managers should assess and balance the public costs and private benefits of a risk-taking
activity, how the public governance duty should be enforced, and to what extent managers
performing that duty should have the traditional protection of a business judgment rule as a
defense to liability. The last issue is especially significant because qualified managers are
unlikely to want to serve without that protection. The article argues that business-judgment-rule
protection is needed to encourage that service but that, because of conflicts of interest, the rule
should be applied slightly differently to managers performing a public governance duty. That
different application should not, however, unduly expose managers to liability, nor should it
require courts to exercise inappropriate discretion.
The proposed public governance duty should significantly reduce, but it could not completely
prevent, the excessive risk-taking that causes systemic externalities. Even if imperfect, however,
that duty should constitute a first step towards shaping corporate governance norms to begin to
take the public into account.
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